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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:
Case No. 981312-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:
Priority No. 2

LYNN KENT DISCH,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant, Lynn Kent Disch, appeals his conviction of possession of a controlled
substance within a correctional facility, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1996). This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of
a controlled substance within a correctional facility?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim,
this Court reviews the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from
it in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 343
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(Utah 1997). A jury conviction will be reversed for insufficient evidence "only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime
of which he was convicted." State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).superseded
bv rule on other grounds. State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); accord Brown.
948P.2dat343.
2. Were defendants due process rights under State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644
(Utah 1986), violated where the prosecutor filed the current charge after voluntarily
dismissing a prior charge that arose from the same incident?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's application of a legal standard to
undisputed facts presents a question of law. State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App.
1993). This Court reviews the district court's conclusions of law for correctness. See
State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856. 859 (Utah 1995).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of all constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the
resolution of the issues before this Court is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 24, 1997, defendant Lynn Kent Disch was charged by information
with possession of a controlled substance within a correctional facility, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1996) (R. 1-2).
2
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Defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the information or quash the
bindover on the ground that his due process rights under State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644
(Utah 1986), were violated when the State filed the current charge against him after
voluntarily dismissing a prior charge arising from the same incident (R. 14-17).
The district court denied defendant's motion, holding that defendant's Brickev rights were
not implicated under the circumstances of this case (R. 19-21).
Following a jury trial on March 30, 1998, defendant was convicted as charged
(R. 103). On May 13, 1998, the district court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate
term of one-to-fifteen-years in the Utah State Prison (R. 106-107). Defendant's timely
notice of appeal ensued (R. 108-109).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 5, 1997, while being booked into jail on an unrelated offense,
defendant possessed a controlled substance within a correctional facility. The following
details are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Gordon.
913P.2d350, 351 (Utah 1996).
On February 5, 1997, Deputy Zane Lammert of the Grand County Sheriffs Office
was contacted by the bailiff to come to the courtroom to take custody of defendant
Lynn Kent Disch, who was being incarcerated on an unrelated matter (R. 116:6-7).
Deputy Lammert works in the Grand County Jail, and his job includes processing inmates
in and out of the jail (R. 116:6).
3
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After taking custody of defendant, Deputy Lammert escorted him to the booking
area, which is within the confines of the jail (R. 116:7-8). The deputy then had defendant
empty his pockets on the countertop so that he could inventory the items (R. 116:7).
At the time that defendant emptied his pockets, the countertop had nothing on it but a
telephone that was bolted down and off to one side (R. 116:9).
Among the numerous items that defendant emptied from his pockets was a small
piece of paper that was rolled into a ball (R. 116:10-11). Upon further examination,
Deputy Lammert discovered that the ball of paper contained a pinkish-white colored rock
(R. 116:12). The rock was not listed on the inventory of defendant's property because
Deputy Lammert confiscated it (R. 116:22, 32). Deputy Lammert then gave the rock to
the state crime lab for analysis (R. 116:12-13). Gary Hunter Naisbitt of the state crime
lab determined that the rock was methamphetamine (R. 116:36).
Defendant was subsequently charged by information with possession of a controlled
substance in a drug free zone (see Aplt. Brief at Addendum B).1 However, prior to trial,
the prosecutor determined that the courthouse might not be a drug free zone, but that
defendant could still be charged with a second degree felony for possession of a controlled
substance within a correctional facility because there is a jail in the courthouse (R. 19-20).

1

The State notes that Addendum A, Addendum B, and Addendum D to defendant's
opening brief on appeal should technically be stricken because they contain non-record
evidence. See State v. Vessev. 967 P.2d 960. 966 (Utah App. 1998). However, inasmuch
as these documents are accurate copies of court documents and are only relevant as factual
background for this case, the State will not move to strike them.
4
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When defendant refused to agree to amendment of the information (id.), the prosecutor
moved to dismiss the prior charge (R. 18, 20), which motion was granted (see Aplt. Brief
at Addendum D).
Defendant was subsequently charged by information with possession of a controlled
substance within a correctional facility, a second degree felony (R. 1-2). Defendant moved
to dismiss the information or quash the bindover, arguing that dismissing the prior charge
and filing the new charge violated his rights under State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644
(Utah 1986) (R. 14-17). The district court denied defendants motion, holding that
defendant's Brickey rights were not implicated under the above circumstances (R. 19-21).
A jury trial was held on March 30, 1998 (R. 116). At trial, Deputy Lammert and
Gary Hunter Naisbitt testified concerning the events surrounding defendant's booking on
February 5, 1997. (R. 116:6-33, 34-36) In defense, defendant called an inmate of the
Grand County jail to testify that he overheard Deputy Lammert say that the
methamphetamine rock in question was found on a lower shelf of the booking area
(R. 116:41-44).

However, that testimony was contradicted by Deputy Lammertfs

testimony that he never made the above statement (R. 116:28). In addition, defendant
himself testified that (1) he knew he was going to be incarcerated on February 5, 1997,
(2) he quit using methamphetamine in early January 1997, (3) when he had used
methamphetamine, he used a yellow rock form called a "lemon drop," not a small pink
rock, (4) he never possessed the ball of paper or the methamphetamine rock at issue here,
5
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and (5) if the ball of paper and methamphetamine rock were in his possession at the time
of his arrest, he did not know that they were and did not intend to bring them into the jail
(R. 116:47, 50, 53-58). Defendant was convicted as charged (R. 103).
After the district court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of
one-to-fifteen-years (R. 106-107), defendant timely appealed (R. 108-109).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant raises two issues on appeal: first, he contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of possession of a controlled
substance within a correctional facility.

Specifically, he argues that (1) because

Deputy Lammert never actually saw the methamphetamine rock in defendant's possession,
there is no evidence connecting the rock to him, and (2) because he testified that he did not
know that he had the methamphetamine on him nor intend to bring it into the jail,
he cannot be found guilty of knowingly and intentionally possessing it. However, because
the jury's verdict is clearly supported by sufficient evidence, defendant's first claim fails.
Second, defendant claims that his due process rights under State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644
(Utah 1986), were violated here. However, Brickey is wholly inapplicable to the facts of
this case, and, in any event, the prosecutor did not violate defendant's due process rights.
Thus, defendant's second claim also fails. Accordingly, defendant's conviction is entitled
to affirmance on appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINTI
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITHIN A
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY.
On appeal, defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction of a controlled substance within a correctional facility. Aplt. Brief at 9-12.
Defendant's argument is two-fold: first, he asserts that there is no evidence connecting the
methamphetamine rock to him because Deputy Lammert never actually saw the rock in
defendant's possession. IdL at 10-11. Second, he claims that he cannot be found guilty of
knowingly and intentionally possessing the methamphetamine rock in question because he
did know that he had it on him and did not intend to bring it into the jail. Id. at 11-12.
It is well settled that the power of an appellate court to overturn a jury's verdict
based on the insufficiency of the evidence is "quite limited." State v. Moore. 802 P.2d
732, 738 (Utah App. 1990); accord State v. Longshaw. 961 P.2d 925, 931 (Utah App.
1998); State v.Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1322 (Utah App. 1993); State v. ScheeL 823 P.2d
470, 472 (Utah App. 1991). Not only does the appellate court review the evidence and
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict, State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997), but a jury conviction will
be reversed for insufficient evidence "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
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inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded bv rule on other grounds.
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); accord Longshaw. 961 P.2d at 931;
State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113. 1117 (Utah App. 1995^.
This Court does not "weigh conflicting evidence, nor [does it] substitute [its]
judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury." Wright. 893 P.2d at
1117; accord Brown. 948 P.2d at 343. Rather, "[i]n a jury trial, 'the jury serves as the
exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given particular
evidence.*" State v. Baker. 963 P.2d 801, 809 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v.
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)).
Put differently, absent a showing that the evidence fails to support a crucial element
of the charged crime or that the evidence is inherently contradictory or incredible,
this Court will not invade the province of jurors to determine credibility or to reverse their
decision. Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992). Thus, in reviewing
a jury verdict, this Court assumes that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict
and disbelieved the evidence contrary thereto. See Brown. 948 P.2d at 343-44 (citing
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1213 (Utah 1993)). Moreover, in order for a reviewing
court to reweigh the evidence, "'there must exist either a physical impossibility of the
evidence being true, or its falsity must be apparent, without any resort to inferences or
8
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deductions/" Workman. 852 P.2d at 984 (quoting Curtis v. DeAtlev. 663 P.2d 1089,
1092 (Idaho 1983) (internal quotation omitted)).
In the present case, Deputy Lammertfs testimony provides sufficient evidence that
defendant possessed the methamphetamine rock in question. As to defendant's first claim,
that there is no evidence connecting the rock to him because the deputy never actually saw
the methamphetamine rock in his possession, the deputy testified as follows: (1) At the
time that he brought defendant to the booking area, the countertop had nothing on it but
a telephone that was bolted down and off to one side; (2) the deputy then had defendant
empty his pockets on the countertop so that he could inventory the items; (3) among the
numerous items that defendant emptied from his pockets was a small piece of paper that
was rolled into a ball; and (4) upon further examination, the deputy discovered that the ball
of paper contained a methamphetamine rock (R. 116:7-12). The reasonable inference from
this testimony is that the methamphetamine rock must have come from defendant's pocket.
Thus, despite the fact that Deputy Lammert never saw the rock on defendant's person, the
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom establish a connection between defendant and
the methamphetamine rock sufficient to show that he possessed it.
Secondly, defendant argues that because he testified that he did not know that he had
the methamphetamine rock and did not intend to bring it into the booking area,
the evidence is insufficient to establish that he knowingly and intentionally possessed a
controlled substance within a correctional facility. Under Utah law, knowledge and intent
9
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may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime. State v. James. 819 P.2d
781, 789 (Utah 1991); see also State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992)
(intent may be inferred from facts and circumstances surrounding crime); State v. Smith.
728 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Utah 1986) ("[p]roof of guilty knowledge, like proof of intent, is
usually circumstantial"). Moreover, whether defendant acted with the required mental
state presents a question of fact to be determined by the fact-finder. State v. Krueger.
363 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 28 (Utah App. 1999) (citing Workman. 852 P.2d at 987).
In the present case, defendant's claim fails in two respects. First, defendant asserts
that the State must show that he knowingly intended to bring the methamphetamine rock
into the booking area. Aplt. Brief at 11. This is an inaccurate statement of the law.
The State must simply show that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the
methamphetamine and that he was within the confines of a correctional facility. See
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(c) (Supp. 1996); State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497, 504-05
(Utah 1989) (aggravating element need not be accompanied by a mens red).
Second, defendant asks this Court to review the evidence and all inferences in favor
of his innocence. This is clearly contrary to Utah law. See Brown. 948 P.2d at 343
(this Court reviews the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from
it in light most favorable to jury's verdict). As noted above, it is proper for a reviewing
court to reweigh the evidence only when there is a physical impossibility of the evidence
being true or when its falsity is apparent "without resort to inferences or deductions."
10
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Workman. 852 P.2d at 984 (citations omitted). In this case, it is clear from the jury's
verdict that the jury rejected defendant's testimony that he did not know he had the
methamphetamine on his person and did not intend to bring it into the booking area, and
instead chose to believe that under the circumstances present here, defendant knowingly
and intentionally possessed the methamphetamine rock at issue. That finding is not clearly
erroneous, and therefore, is entitled to deference on appeal.
Moreover, while defendant correctly points out that contradictory evidence on both
of his claims was presented to the jury, see Aplt. Brief at 10-11, '"[t]he existence of
contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury's
verdict."' Longshaw. 961 P.2d at 931 (quoting State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97
(Utah 1982)); accord State v. Bradley. 752 P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1985). This is especially
true here where the only evidence supporting defendant's version of the facts is his own
self-serving testimony and the testimony of another inmate who was equally incredible.
Furthermore, it is well settled that a defendant's claim that the evidence is
insufficient to support the jury's verdict "necessarily fails when the defendant 'presumes
that the jury was obligated to believe the evidence most favorable to the defendant rather
than that presented in opposition by the State."' Longshaw. 961 P.2d at 931 (quoting
Howell. 649 P.2d at 97). This is precisely what has occurred here. Defendant's brief on
appeal focuses on the testimony that supports his version of the facts; however, it is clear
from the verdict that the jury rejected this very testimony. Thus, defendant may not rely
11
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on it on appeal unless the evidence supporting the verdict is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable. Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 931: Brown. 948 P.2d at 343; Wright. 893
P.2d at 1117; Petree, 659 P.2d at 444. Because the evidence below conclusively
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the methamphetamine rock
in question within the confines of a correctional facility, the jury's verdict is not subject
to reversal on appeal on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence.
POINTII

DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER
BRICKEY WERE NOT IMPLICATED HERE, AND,
IN ANY EVENT, THEY WERE NOT VIOLATED.
Defendant's second claim on appeal is that his due process rights under
State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), were violated when the prosecutor dismissed
the charges in his prior case and filed the charges here.
In Brickey, the Utah Supreme Court held that due process considerations limit the
State's ability to refile charges that have been dismissed for insufficient evidence. IdL
at 647-48. Specifically, the court determined that the State cannot refile criminal charges
dismissed by a magistrate for lack of evidence unless it can introduce new or additional
evidence, or demonstrate other good cause that justifies refiling. Id The reason for this
rule is so that the preliminary hearing may be used as "a screening device to 'ferret out
. . . groundless and improvident prosecutions.1" Id at 646 (quoting State v. Anderson.
612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted)).
12
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The instant case is readily distinguishable from Brickev. First, this case does not
involve charges that were dismissed by a magistrate for insufficient evidence. Instead, the
State itself voluntarily dismissed the charges, and not because of the insufficiency of the
evidence supporting the first charge, but because it had charged defendant under the wrong
subsection of the statute. Second, unlike Brickev. this is not a case where the same charge
was refiled; instead, there was a new, and corrected, charge filed here. Third, the case
at bar does not involve the sort of groundless or improvident prosecution that Brickev was
intended to combat. In fact, defendant does not dispute that the acts with which he was
charged constitute a crime. Instead, he argues that the State should have been barred from
filing the current charge against him after voluntarily dismissing a prior charge arising
from the same incident simply because it was the prosecutor's charging error in the prior
case that led to the dismissal of that case. Aplt. Brief at 14. Thus, because the present
case does not involve a groundless or improvident prosecution, the due process
considerations of Brickev are plainly inapplicable here. For all these reasons, Brickev is
inapposite to the case at bar.
Moreover, the actions taken by the State here are firmly supported under Utah law.
Rule 7(h)(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, expressly provides that "dismissal and
discharge" following a preliminary hearing "do not preclude the state from instituting a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense." Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3). Further, it is
well settled that jeopardy does not attach in a criminal jury trial until the jury has been
13
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sworn and impaneled. See State v. Castle. 951 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Utah App. 1998) (citing
State v. Ambrose. 598 P.2d 354, 358 (Utah 1979)). Thus, because a dismissal at the
preliminary hearing stage does not constitute a jeopardy bar to new charges, a prosecutor
has discretion to refile charges at that time subject only to the limitations of Brickey. See
State v. Jaeger. 886 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1994); Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646-47. Accordingly,
because Brickey is wholly inapplicable to the facts of this case, the prosecutor's exercise
of his discretion in this case did not violate defendant's due process rights.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendants conviction.
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Oral argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case.
Moreover, because this case raises no novel question of law, a published opinion would
add nothing to the body of Utah law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this iiTday of March, 1999.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

NORMAN E. PLATE
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
i
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